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FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE MODERATES: ISRAELI IDENTITY AND 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Since the late 1990s, Israeli foreign policy toward the Middle East has been shaped by what I define 
as the Moderate Axis Conception. According to this conception, the Middle East is in a midst of a 
conflict between moderate, pro-status quo and generally pro-Western Arab regimes, and a radical 
Iran-led Islamist axis. Israel, the conception suggests, could rely on cooperation with the moderates 
in its own conflicts with the radical axis. This article examines the sources of this conception. It 
argues that it has been shaped not purely by rational calculations of power and threat, but by Israel’s 
identity and self-perception. Viewing itself as a moderate in a region prone to radicalism, Israel has 
sought to forge alliances with similar actors. In fact, this article demonstrates, this self-perception 
has guided Israeli foreign policy before the rise of this conception. The Periphery Doctrine, which 
dominated Israeli strategic thinking until the 1980s, is another example for this inclination. 
However, whereas in the Periphery Doctrine the moderates were represented by non-Arab or non-
Muslim powers in the region and the radicals by pan-Arabism, the Moderate Axis Conception has 
redefined the moderates and the radicals, or the periphery and center. 
 
Observers of Israeli foreign policy since the early 2000s would identify a constant reference 
to the “moderate Arab states,” “moderate Sunni axis,” “moderate Arab governments,” or 
simply “moderate Arabs.”1 These terms usually, if not always, denote the conservative 
secular dictatorships and monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa. These include 
Egypt, Jordan, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led by Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, and the Maghreb states (especially Morocco and Tunisia). 
The frequent use of this term reflects the increasingly popular conception among 
Israeli policy makers and public opinion that some kind of a “moderate axis” has emerged in 
the Arab World. At the heart of this conception lies the Israeli belief in the potential of 
establishing an alliance with members of this so-called moderate axis against joint threats in 
the region, and particularly the ones emanating from Iran/the so-called Shi’i Crescent and 
from Islamist terror networks, such as al-Qa’eda. This conception constitutes an important 
turn in Israeli foreign policy making and regional security strategy. I refer in this article to 
this turn as the emergence of the Moderate Axis Conception. 
2 
 
Albeit its prominence in Israeli thinking, most observers have failed to notice, or at 
least fully comprehend, the growing prominence of the Moderate Axis Conception. This 
paper provides one of the first accounts of this conception, its origins, evolution and impact. 
Tracing the origins and the evolution of this conception could provide us with important 
insights into Israeli foreign policy toward the Middle East, as well as regional geopolitics. 
In this article, I explore the evolution of the Moderate Axis Conception and its impact 
on Israel’s foreign policy. Although the conception came to prevail in Israeli thinking in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, my research has gone back to the early days of the formation of 
Israeli foreign policy. The hypothesis guiding this is that one cannot understand the formation 
of a foreign policy conception independently of previous conceptions and trends. My 
research has come up with several findings concerning Israel’s foreign policy. First, my 
investigation reveals some strong aspects of continuity between the Moderate Axis 
Conception and previous conceptions and doctrines. Although, as I elaborate below, the 
components of each conception are notably different, many of the same ideas and principles 
have guided both conceptions. The similarities are particularly striking given the different 
environments in which both emerged. Second, my research reveals that both conceptions 
gained popularity even though they failed to fulfill some of their promises. This leads me to 
my third argument based on the research. The above two findings reveal that Israel’s foreign 
policy making has been molded by factors other than regional rivalries, sense of threat and 
conflict. Another important factor that should be taken into account is Israel’s identity and 
self-perception, as shaped by its political elites. Israel’s identity and self-perception have 
been important in shaping its understanding of threat, regional rivalry, and consequently also 
its view of potential allies. 
These finding have significant implications for our understanding of Israel’s foreign 
policy in particular and of regional geopolitics in general. Students of Israeli foreign policy 
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have tended to portray its foreign policy making as based on rational calculation of balance of 
power and threat. Consequently, they have come to see regional geopolitics as defined by a 
relatively narrow set of conflicts and contestations over regional hegemony. A good example 
for that is Trita Parsi’s study of the history of Israeli-Iranian relations. Already at the 
beginning of his work, Parsi asserts that “the geopolitical rivalry between Israel and Iran has 
– since the Cold War – been the underlying conflict that defined the context of almost all 
other matters in the region.”2 Parsi’s portrayal of Middle Eastern geopolitics presents a 
somewhat simplistic picture, which renders any effort to understand the sources of actors' 
decision-making processes unnecessary. 
Certainly, the conflict between Israel and Iran is an important theme in regional 
geopolitics. However, I argue here that this conflict is only one aspect of wider processes 
within both Israel and the region. In other words, the Iranian-Israeli conflict, or perhaps what 
has come to be described as a regional “cold war,” is the product, rather the underlying cause, 
of historical socio-political dynamics in the Middle East. Similarly, Israel's growing 
adherence to the so-called moderate axis cannot be narrowed to their common fear of the 
Iranian threat (real or exaggerated), or of any other specific threat, such as transnational 
Islamist terrorism. The Moderate Axis Conception itself marks such a significant turn in 
Israel's stand toward its Arab neighbors that it requires us to go beyond explanations that 
revolve around material capabilities or perceptions of threat. Taking into account Israel’s 
identity and self-perception as essential factors of policy making comes in handy in 
explaining Israel’s perceptions of threat and alliances. 
This begs the following questions: what is actually Israel’s identity? And how can we 
prove the causal link between Israel’s identity and its policy making? Michael Barnett has 
defined identity as “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others.”3 According to 
Barnett, such understanding is molded not solely by the other's actions, but also by one's 
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historical experiences, key events and evolution. Here there is a wide agreement among 
students of Israel's history about the key events that have shaped its evolution and identity. 
Most notable are the history of persecution in Europe, which culminated in the holocaust; the 
conflict with the Arabs, both inside and outside of Palestine; and the 1948 War of 
Independence. Barnett has highlighted religion, nationalism and liberalism as important 
elements of Israeli identity.4 Mira Sucharov has also added the pre-exile events of the fall of 
Masada (73 CE) or the Bar Kochba Revolt against the Roman Empire (132 CE) as 
experiences that have influenced modern Israeli identity. Both Sucharov and Barnett agree 
that these factors have created among Israeli elites and the wider public a sense of isolation 
and defensiveness in relation to its immediate environment. As Barnett suggests, Israel has 
perceived itself as “existentially isolated, its existence is always in jeopardy, and it faces a 
series of threats from various quarters that vary only in the level of overt intensity and 
hostility.”5 Sucharov maintains that Israel has come to view itself as a defensive warrior that 
engages only in “no-choice (eyn breira)” wars.6 
This sense of isolation has indeed been reflected in both pre-state Zionist discourse 
and the official discourse and conduct of the Israeli state. An early example is the Iron Wall 
theory of the Revisionist Zionist leader, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Manifested in his 1923 essay 
bearing the same title, Jabotinsky came out against contemporary efforts by the leaders of the 
Yishuv, namely pre-state Zionist institutions in Palestine under the British mandate, to seek 
reconciliation or forge alliances with Arab forces. Jabotinsky held the opinion that the Arabs 
would never accept Israel’s existence at the heart of the Arab World. Therefore, he advocated 
an isolationist policy of unilateralism to guarantee the security of the Jewish state to come.7 
In 1996, the-then Israel’s Foreign Minister Ehud Barak presented another manifestation of 
this sense of threat and isolation. In a speech before American Jewish leaders he declared that 
Israel is “a modern and prosperous villa in the middle of the jungle… No hope for those who 
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cannot defend themselves and no mercy for the weak.”8 Thus, since its early days Israel’s 
political elites have viewed their country as an alien in the region, perennially subjected to 
hostilities from those constituting the center, bound to remain so in the future to come. In 
contrast to an environment characterized by irrationality and radicalism, Israel has viewed 
itself as a moderate, committed to status quo and regional stability. 
The Moderate Axis Conception echoes this notion. As I demonstrate in this article, 
Israel has come to perceive the members of the moderate axis as reflecting its own identity, at 
least to an extent, and therefore as potential allies. Here comes in my second hypothesis. I 
argue here that the Moderate Axis Conception is not exceptional in this regard. Rather, this 
conception is in fact a reincarnation of the Periphery Doctrine, which had guided Israeli 
foreign policy in the region throughout most of its existence until the 1990s. The premise of 
this doctrine was that Israel's Arab neighbors could not accept the existence of Israel in the 
region due to their adherence to pan-Arabism. Hence, advocates of Periphery Doctrine 
advanced a strategic collaboration between Israel and non-Arab or non-Muslim actors in the 
Middle East. Those included Iran, Turkey and Ethiopia, as well some non-state actors in the 
region, and most notably the Maronites in Lebanon. The essence of the doctrine was that 
these actors shared with Israel the same sense of threat from pan-Arabism, and would 
therefore embrace such collaboration. The Periphery Doctrine has served as subject of some 
debate among students of Israeli foreign policy. Several observers, and most markedly 
students of Israeli-Iranian relations, have inclined toward the explanation that the Periphery 
Doctrine ceased to exist during the 1990s.9 In contrast, students of Turkish-Israeli relations 
have asserted that the Periphery Doctrine survived well into the 1990s, and even the 2000s.10 
I suggest here a different interpretation of the fate of the Periphery Doctrine. While 
the doctrine as envisioned by its founders had indeed become obsolete toward the late 1980s 
due to shifts in regional geopolitics, the logic that had guided this doctrine remained highly 
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relevant, continuing to guide Israeli policy makers. The Moderate Axis Conception, while at 
first glance different from the Periphery Doctrine, actually represents the same core beliefs 
held by Israeli elites about Israel, its identity, place in the Middle East and interaction with its 
surrounding states. The character of periphery and center might have changed now, but not 
existence of such concepts. This is because the Periphery Doctrine never really treated the 
concepts of periphery and center in geographical terms. Rather, the center was defined by the 
threat to Israel. The periphery, in turn, came to be composed of those sharing the sense of 
threat from the center. The enemy has been the ideologies coming out against Israel’s values 
and identity. Since Israel identified itself with moderation, rationality and order, this meant 
that its potential enemies have been those associated with radicalism and the challenge to the 
existing order. The demise of the Periphery Doctrine and the rise of the Moderate Axis 
Conception toward the late 1990s support this assertion. The Moderate Axis Conception, in 
fact, has been a transmutation of the Periphery Doctrine. Pan-Arabism had ceased to be 
associated with radicalism, whereas radical Islamism ascended. This transition has had less to 
do with capabilities and intentions, but rather with the way Israel has come to perceive its 
enemies. 
What I propose in the following sections is that there is nothing obvious or predicted 
about the way Israel has defined its threat and its allies. The way in which Israel has 
envisioned its allies has relied greatly on the belief that they share with Israel’s some features 
of its self-perception. To be sure, there have been a few studies to have traced identity as a 
source of Israeli foreign policy. Michael Brecher demonstrated that the enemy’s image was 
an important factor in shaping Israeli foreign policy decision making in times of crisis during 
the 1970s.11 Ofira Seliktar identified the rise of “New Zionism,” dominated by aspirations for 
territorial aggrandizement, as a source of change Israel’s foreign policy systems and 
decisions since 1967.12 Sasson Sofer argued that different ideological streams of Zionism had 
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different impact on the formation of Israeli foreign policy.13 Michael Barnett used Israel’s 
decision to engage in peace negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 
in spite of the latter’s obvious military inferiority, to challenge explanations based on the 
distribution of power and capabilities.14 Sucharov has examined Israel’s path to the Oslo 
Accords with the PLO as a consequence of cognitive ideational processes. Applying tools 
from psychoanalysis to the study of foreign policy, she has traced the source of the seeming 
paradox in Israel’s choice to embrace negotiations to the growing dissonance between Israel’s 
self-perception as a defensive warrior and its increasingly preemptive and perceived 
aggressive conduct against the PLO in Lebanon in the 1980s and the Palestinians during the 
First Intifada.15 Brent Sasley has also pinpointed identity as a factor in Israel’s foreign policy 
making, and especially Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s path to the Oslo Accords. He has 
highlighted emotions, or more precisely affect heuristic, as a source of policy making. 
According to Sasley, “an affect heuristic shapes decisions by highlighting the intuitive or 
emotional meaning that objects, events, or people have for the decision-maker.”16 The fact 
that Rabin, unlike his predecessor Yitzhak Shamir, had no emotional attachment to the idea 
of Greater Israel, meant that it was easier for him to go for the Oslo Accords. 
These works have been instrumental in establishing the importance of identity as a 
variable in Israeli decision-making process. Therefore they provide an important platform for 
my argument. However, they have focused primarily on the formulation of foreign policy 
than its implementation. In addition, they have not given enough room to structural factors, 
whether in terms of interaction with other actors or regional geopolitics.17 As I demonstrate, 
focusing on identity and ideational factors as sources of strategy and policy making does not 
render structural dynamics and factors irrelevant. Geopolitical developments, the discourse, 
signals and actions of other actors are filtered through Israel’s identity and perceptions of self 
and other. In addition, most of these studies have examined specific episodes in Israeli 
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foreign policy making. In contrast, I focus here on aspects of continuity and change in 
Israel’s regional strategy and foreign policy since its formation. In this manner, this paper 
provides one of the first comprehensive examinations of the role of Israel’s identity in 
shaping its security strategy over the long term. 
To achieve its aim, the rest of this article is divided into four parts. The first section 
examines the evolution of the Periphery Doctrine. The following section focuses on its 
gradual transmutation into the Moderate Axis Conception. The third section discusses the 
aims of the Moderate Axis Conception. The final section before conclusion provides a brief 
analysis of the prospects of this conception, amid recent developments in Israel’s immediate 
environment, and particularly the events of the Arab Spring. 
 
 
The Periphery Doctrine: Israel’s coming to Terms with its Status 
We can trace the modus operandi of the Periphery Doctrine to the Yishuv days, when its 
leaders established contacts with the Maronite Church in Mount Lebanon. The Jewish 
leadership sympathized with the Maronite community, whom it viewed as another isolated 
ethno-religious minority, facing Arab and Islamic expansionism.18 This gave birth to the 
notion of natural alliance, which was in turn boosted by the Maronite Church’s occasional 
support of the idea of a Jewish state.19 This idea of a natural alliance will become a recurring 
theme of the Periphery Doctrine. 
The doctrine as systematic agenda guiding Israel’s foreign policy began to take shape 
during Israel’s first years of existence. In 1952 a group of officers led by Colonel Gamal 
‘Abd el-Nasser, known as the Free Officers, overthrew the Muhammad Ali Dynasty that had 
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ruled Egypt since the early years of the 19th century. This coup d’état marked a turn in 
regional geopolitics. It witnessed not only dramatic reforms in Egypt’s politics, economy and 
society, but also the rise of the Nasserist stream of pan-Arabism. Striving toward the 
unification of the Arab states, Nasserism viewed colonialism and imperialism as the main 
obstacles to achieving this goal. For the Nasserists, Zionism and the State of Israel 
represented both in the region.20 The 1956 War, in which Israel joined Britain and France in 
attacking Egypt, intensified this notion and Nasser exacerbated his verbal attacks on Israel. 
Another current of pan-Arabism to emerge during that period was Ba’athism. The 
Ba’ath (renaissance) Party and its ideology began ascending during the 1950s in Syria and 
Iraq, eventually becoming the dominant ideology in both countries during the 1960s. Much 
like Nasserism, Ba’athism sought the reunification of the Arab world through struggle against 
imperialism and its representative in the region, namely Zionism.21 Soon, and especially after 
the failure of the Syrian-Egyptian unification (1958-1961), both ideologies began competing 
against each other for the minds and hearts of the Arab publics. Consequently, both Nasser 
and the Ba’athists increased the level of their verbal attacks on Israel.  
Students of regional politics have questioned the level of Nasserist and Ba’athist 
commitments to their discourse.22 But for contemporary Israeli analysts, still bearing the 
memories of the joint Arab attack on Israel in 1948 and gradually exposed to the horrors of 
the holocaust, pan-Arabism came to constitute an existential threat. In fact, Israeli policy 
makers viewed pan-Arabism as a threat even before the rise of Nasser. Baruch Uziel, a 
Member of Knesset (MK), who was to be one of the first advocates of the Periphery 
Doctrine, argued already in 1948, even after its victory over the invading Arab armies, that 
the greatest danger facing Israel was the aim to create a unified “Arab confederation” or 
empire. Such entity, he lamented, would not tolerate non-Arab entities in its heart.23  
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In reality, both the Egyptian and the Syrian armies were inferior to the Israeli armed 
forces, subjected to political intervention and underequipped. Nevertheless, the statements 
and actions of pan-Arabism became increasingly worrying from an Israeli perspective. 
Nasser’s closure of the Straits of Tiran in 1956 and Egypt’s support of the Palestinian 
Fedayeen (who were raiding Israel from the Gaza Strip and Jordan) exacerbated this fear. 
Israeli leaders now deemed pan-Arabism as an irreconcilable power, a radical element 
seeking to eradicate Israel as part of its aspiration to alter the regional order. 
Some revisionist historians have suggested that the Israeli leadership, and particularly 
Ben-Gurion and the IDF Chief of Staff at the time, Moshe Dayan, in fact sought to engage in 
a war with Nasser and the other Arab states after the former had come to power. Some 
accounts have gone as far as suggesting that Israeli actions aimed to drive Nasser to declare 
war on Israel, and that the 1956 Suez Crisis was a product of such efforts.24 However, even if 
this argument carries some merit it does not necessarily contradict Israel’s sense of alarm and 
threat amid Arab intentions. Ben-Gurion and Dayan’s eagerness to start a war can be seen as 
part of a preemptive strategy. More important, the discourse employed by Israeli policy 
makers at the time, before but also after the 1956 War, still reflected the Israeli apprehension 
of pan-Arabism. Baruch Uziel, for example, reiterated his statements about pan-Arabism.25 
The Periphery Doctrine was a response to the threat emanating from pan-Arabism. 
This doctrine did not emerge in a vacuum. During this period the United States and Britain 
orchestrated the formation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as 
Baghdad Pact). CENTO united regimes on the periphery of the Middle East, including 
Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, to serve as a bulwark against Soviet influence in the region and 
access to the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. The Israeli leadership was exposed to CENTRO’s 
formation mainly through Israeli government’s constant consultations with the Eisenhower 
administration.26 
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This inspired Ben-Gurion and his aides to seek establishing their own peripheral 
alliance. If the “center” was characterized by pan-Arab radicalism, the-then natural allies 
were to be those believed to be threatened by it. Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia matched the 
profile. The 1958 coup d’état in Iraq, led by General ‘Abd el-Karim Qassem and his team of 
Free Officers, brought the threat of pan-Arabism to Iran’s doorstep.27 Ethiopia, in turn has 
long felt threatened by Egyptian hegemonic aspirations. The strengthening of Nasserists in 
Sudan gave Ethiopia more reasons for concerns.28 The Maronites in Lebanon were also 
considered as a potential element in the doctrine. Israel’s intervention in support of the 
leading Maronite party, the Lebanese Forces (Kataeb) in the 1958 civil war in Lebanon can 
be seen as one of the first steps toward implementing the Periphery Doctrine. Of all potential 
allies, Ankara was the least receptive to the idea of the alliance. It had warmer relations with 
the Arab states than Iran or Ethiopia,29 was more dependent on Arab oil and was already a 
recipient of American-aid as a NATO member. The increasing influence of pan-Arabism in 
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon drove Turkey to somewhat overcome its initial hesitance, but up 
until the 1990s Turkey had remained the weakest link in the doctrine, frequently cooling and 
warming its relations with Israel. 
Israel’s aim was to create a multilateral alliance whose members would come to each 
other’s aid when facing a threat from the center. Yet, the doctrine never fully materialized 
and failed to achieve most of its goals. According to Baruch Gilad, no formal treaty was 
signed and cooperation between the constituent members remained mostly bilateral. For that, 
Gilad notes, the term Periphery Doctrine is “misleading.”30 Nevertheless, these bilateral 
alliances had been productive, at least until the 1970s. They involved intelligence, economic 
and even cultural exchanges. One of the better known examples was Israeli-Iranian 
cooperation in support of the Kurdish uprising in Iraq in the early 1970s. Aiming to 
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counteract the Ba’ath government, this cooperation also integrated, at least for a short period, 
the Kurdish guerrillas into the doctrine. 
Even these bilateral relations, however, began cracking during the 1970s. In 1973, the 
Ethiopian monarch Haile Selassie cut his formal ties with Israel under pressure by the African 
Union and the Arab states following the 1973 crisis. In 1974 Selassie was ousted in a coup by 
Marxist-leaning officers, who severed most remaining cooperation with Israel. The oil 
embargo declared by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) forced 
Ankara to minimize its formal cooperation with Israel and demote the level of bilateral 
diplomatic relations. Finally, in 1979 the Iranian Shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, was forced 
to flee Iran amid a mass public protest, which turned into the Iranian Revolution. After a 
short period of political contestation, power was taken by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a 
cleric who steered Iran into becoming a Shi’i theocracy. As Nasserism before, the Islamist 
regime in Tehran turned Israel into a subject of constant attacks as a symbol of Western 
imperialism. This time, Khomeini spoke in terms of the Muslim, rather than the Arab, world. 
From an Israeli perspective as well, the doctrine lost some of its rationale. The 1967 
War, in which Israel defeated the Egyptian and Syrian armies in six days, greatly undermined 
the foundations of Nasserism and pan-Arabism. Nasser’s death in 1970 and the coming to 
power of his successor, Anwar Sadat, marked the end of Nasserist pan-Arabism. Although 
paying lip service to Nasserism, Sadat held different views with regard to Egypt’s future and 
its relations with the West. Even the 1973 War, which Egypt launched against Israel jointly 
with Syria, aimed at improving the former’s position in future negotiations, rather than 
eliminating Israel.31 In 1979 Israel signed the Camp David Accord with Egypt. The leader of 
pan-Arabism was now formally ostracized by most other Arab states. In reality, other Arab 
states also began revising their stance toward Israel. 
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Still, during most of the 1980s Israel continued to adhere to the Periphery Doctrine. In 
1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, torn by a civil war between the Maronites on the one side, and 
the Shi’i and Palestinian factions on the other. Israel’s stated-purpose was to clear southern 
Lebanon of the PLO, which was using the chaos in the country to launch attacks against 
Israeli border towns. Nonetheless, Israeli leaders had other, far-reaching plans. Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon hoped to take over Beirut and “crown” the leader of the Maronite 
Kataeb leader Bashir Gemayel as president. He envisioned a pro-Israeli government that 
would serve as a bulwark against Syria. The plan collapsed when Gemayel was assassinated 
shortly after his election for presidency. 
A more notable remnant of the Periphery Doctrine was Israel’s cooperation with Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq War. Following the takeover of the American embassy by militant 
revolutionaries in 1979 and the ensuing hostage crisis, Iran became subjected to international 
embargo. In contrast, Iraq enjoyed the not so tacit support of the Gulf Arab states and the US. 
Desperate for arms, members of the Iranian government addressed their Israeli contacts from 
the Shah days for assistance. Israel still viewed Iraq as the greater menace. The Iraqi Ba’ath 
regime spearheaded the campaign against Israel. It sponsored the PLO and other Palestinian 
factions, and also pursued nuclear capabilities.32 On the other hand, many of those who 
experienced the golden age of Iranian-Israeli cooperation believed that the enmity with Iran is 
only temporary and that the Shah’s regime will be restored. Hence, the Israeli government 
permitted Israeli arms dealers to mediate a deal between Iran and senior figures in the Ronald 
Reagan administration. The Reagan administration in turn, accepted the deal in return for the 
release of American prisoners held by Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah. The money was 
used to sponsor the Contra rebels in Nicaragua.33 The affair was exposed in 1986 and was 
terminated. Toward the late 1980s even the most optimistic among the advocates of the 
Periphery Doctrine realized that chances for restoring Israeli-Iranian cooperation are slim. 
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Prima facie, the Periphery Doctrine represents a classic case of realpolitik. Amid the 
seeming danger emanating from pan-Arabism on its different currents, Israel looked for allies 
that shared with it this sense of threat. However, a closer examination of the doctrine and 
Israel’s conduct would reveal that Israel’s decision to ally with the so-called periphery was 
not based solely on pure strategic calculations of power distribution and threat. Israel stuck to 
the Periphery Doctrine even when its potential allies proved incapable of providing what 
Israel had been looking for. It kept sticking to the doctrine even during the 1980s, after its 
members had renounced it or proven incapable of contributing to it. And it did so even as the 
threat from pan-Arabism clearly declined.  
A better explanation for the Periphery Doctrine, therefore, would be one that takes 
identity into the picture. Israel’s view of Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia and the Maronites as potential 
allies was based on the fact that these actors seemed to have a shared identity with Israel. 
Albeit having inherently different political systems, all potential members of the alliance 
espoused a regional order which put the nation state at the center and objected universal 
trends such as pan-Arabism or Communism. Of course, some of the more conservative Arab 
regimes, such as the Saudi and Hashemite monarchies, espoused similar views. In public, 
nonetheless, the norms of pan-Arabism, which dominated regional geopolitics, induced them 
to act within the pan-Arab framework.34 In addition, these actors were dominated by 
Westernized elites, whose identification with the West went beyond mere strategic necessity. 
As such, all of the members of the Periphery Doctrine felt not only threatened by pan-Arab 
radicalism and (declared) desire to destroy the existing regional order, but also antagonistic 
toward the pan-Arabs’ anti-Western sentiments. This sense of sympathy was particularly 
clear in the case of the Maronites. An esoteric but good example for that is the common 
reference by Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) officers to the Kataeb militias as “aftershave 
warriors,” an allusion to the Maronites’ so-called Western customs.35 Years of close 
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collaboration between Israeli intelligence officers and the Kataeb heavily influenced Israel’s 
support of the Maronites and the Israeli leadership’s interpretation Maronites’ interests and 
actions.36 
One more underlying factor behind the Periphery Doctrine was Israel’s desire to 
exhibit its vitality and viability to major powers, and especially the US. As Michael Bar 
Zohar suggests, “for the first time, Israel sensed that it had something to offer to the 
Americans: no longer would it be a small, isolated ally, hated and ostracized by all Arab 
countries, but the leader and the connecting link of a bloc of states.”37 This and the other 
factors shaping the Periphery Doctrine teach us that Israel’s perception of its allies has been 
not solely a response to external threats, but were also a product of internally-driven factors, 
and chiefly Israel’s identity and self-perception.  The rise of the Moderate Axis conception 
further supports this assertion. 
 
 
The Moderate Axis: Breaking a Taboo 
The image of some sort of a moderate Arab axis is not a novelty. Foreign powers, as well as 
some of the Arab regimes themselves, have used this terminology to describe political camps 
in the region, or justify their choices of allies. Mostly, the term has been used to describe 
political elites either willing or desiring to accept some form of Western presence or 
influence in the region and to coordinate policies with Western powers, due to political, 
cultural or economic interests. Already in 1939 the British mandate authorities in Palestine 
referred to existence of “‘moderate’ Palestinian Arab leaders,” prepared to take a “less 
uncompromising line than that adopted by the more extreme leaders.”38 By the 1950s, the 
division between moderates and radicals by American foreign policy makers reflected the rise 
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of Nasserism and pan-Arabism in general as the epithet of radicalism. In 1958 the Executive 
Secretary of the U.S. National Security Council, James Lay, argued that the U.S. government 
should “seek to counterbalance Egypt’s preponderant position of leadership in the Arab world 
by helping increase the political prestige and economic strength of other more moderate Arab 
states such as Iraq, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.”39 In 1967 a British cabinet report 
echoed this view; discussing the possibility of an oil embargo on Britain and the US, it 
concluded that such act is “what the more moderate governments have judged to be the least 
they could get away with as a gesture of solidarity and a safety valve for popular pressures.”40 
In 1973 it was the Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs’, Omar al-Saqqaf, who urged 
Washington to “strengthen the hand of Arab moderates at the [Arab League] conference.” He 
commented that “Baghdad’s and Tripoli’s absence [from the conference] will make it much 
easier for the more moderate Arab states to dominate the session.”41 
The years to follow witnessed some change and the surfacing of what would turn into 
the contemporary Arab moderate camp. With Nasser’s demise and the coming to power of 
Sadat, even prior to the Camp David Accords, Egypt gradually integrated into the moderate 
camp. A CIA report on the Arab Summit that took place in November 1973 (that is, after the 
1973 War) reported that “President Sadat's efforts to assure that the moderate Arab states 
control the summit have pre-empted the radicals.”42 In 1982, a CIA report on potential Arab 
intervention in the Iran-Iraq War noted that “None of the moderate Arab states except Egypt 
have the military capability to make a significant contribution to the fighting.”43 
Yet, the Israeli political elites had remained aloof toward the existence of “moderate 
Arabs.” Even the peace agreement with Egypt did not suffice to defuse such skepticism. In 
1986 Likud MK Ehud Olmert declared in the Knesset that 
The murderous Palestinian terrorism could not have spread as cancer… if not for the nurturing, 
support and encouragement by Arab states. Syria and Libya are the most radical, irrational and 
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unrestrained among them. But what about the other, allegedly peaceful, Arab states, which are 
considered, justly or not, as civilized and moderate? Has Iraq not served as a base for PLO 
activism in the region? And… what about Jordan, which serves as one of the most important 
PLO bases in the region? And… what about our friend Egypt?44 
Olmert’s proclamation is remarkable because as prime minister (2006-2009) he would adhere 
to the Moderate Axis Conception. Earlier, in 1981, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon uttered 
that “we face massive arms concentrations in the countries making up what is termed in the 
West as the moderate Arab states, be it Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ethipia [sic] or South Yemen.”45 
There were of course some exceptions. In 1978 opposition MK Yitzhak Rabin implored the 
Likud government to come to the Maronites’ aid in the civil war, contending that “the 
combination of militarily strengthening the Christians and political activity in which Egypt 
and other moderate Arab states will participate, is the key to a settlement of the situation in 
Lebanon.”46 Nonetheless, in the short-term Israel remained mostly unconvinced by Arab 
moderation 
Throughout most of the 1990s Israel’s strategy’s main pillar in the region was its 
strategic partnership with Turkey. Still dominated by the Periphery Doctrine, Israel now 
focused its efforts on its last willing member. During this period, bilateral security and 
diplomatic cooperation, and even cultural exchanges, reached new peaks. In 1996 both 
countries signed a military agreement. As a result, in October 1998 Israel pledged its support 
for Turkey in its military standoff with Syria.47 Also in the spirit of the Periphery Doctrine, 
both governments sought to expand it to other actors. One example was Azerbaijan, Turkey’s 
rising ally from among the former Soviet Republics. Through Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel 
aimed to contain Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor.48 
Nevertheless, developments during the early 1990s started a process of change, which 
drove Israel to revise its attitude toward the Arab moderates. Most notable among these were 
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Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War; the of Israeli-Arab dialogue which began in the Madrid 
Conference in 1991; and the ascendance of political Islam as a major political force. Iraq’s 
decision to invade Kuwait, and more so its defeat by a US-led coalition which also included 
Egypt and Syria and was supported by other Arab states, set a final blow to pan-Arabism. 
Already losing much of its appeal in the 1970s, the Gulf War fully exposed this ideology’s 
fragility and irrelevance. The Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Peace Accord 
between Israel and the PLO under Yasser Arafat in 1993 cracked Israel’s sense of isolation. 
In 1994 Israel signed a peace agreement with Jordan. After years of covert collaboration, the 
Oslo Accords legitimized the outing of the cozy Hashemite-Israeli relations. While not 
signing a formal peace agreement, Morocco as well felt more comfortable about its quasi-
secret dealings with Israel. An unparalleled development was Israel’s budding relationship 
with the Gulf monarchies. The rapprochement between Israel and the GCC states remained 
mostly informal. Nonetheless, two member states, Qatar and Oman, formed official partial 
diplomatic relations with Israel. According to Uzi Rabi, these two small oil-rich monarchies 
aimed to establish a foreign policy independent of their neighbors, and especially Saudi 
Arabia.49 The latter, weakened by a sharp decrease in oil prices, grudgingly accepted this 
normalization.50 
Along these developments, Islamism now ascended to the center stage of regional 
geopolitics. Soon it took the place of pan-Arabism as the epitome of radicalism in the Middle 
East, and hence as the main threat facing Israel. Islamism has actually had three different 
forms. The first has been Iran. The former ally has now taken the lead in the campaign 
against Israel’s existence, employing virulent attacks against Zionism. During the early 1990s 
Iran was also alleged to stand behind deadly attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets across 
the globe, and most notably the attacks on the against the Jewish Community Center and 
Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, taking place in 1994 and 1992 respectively. The second 
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embodiment has been Hezbollah. The Lebanese party, proclaiming to represent the Shi’i 
community in Lebanon, constantly targeted Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon. Perceived 
as Iran’s arm in the Mashreq region, Hezbollah was an also an alleged accomplice in the 
Buenos Aires attacks and other global operations. The third form of Islamism has been the 
Sunni threat. During the 1990s it was represented by the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad. These movements comprised the “Rejectionist Front” against Palestinian-Israeli peace, 
and inflicted upon Israel heavy military and civilian casualties through sporadic campaigns of 
suicide attacks.51 Toward the late 1990s, and mainly after the September 11 attack in 2001, 
transnational Sunni Islamism came to the fore, also encompassing Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
The rise of Iran as a major existential threat resurfaced Israeli fears of Weapons of 
Mass Destructions (WMD), and especially nuclear weapons capability. The polemic within 
Israel around the Iranian nuclear threat, which has dominated Israel’s security concerns in 
recent years, actually began long before Iranian oppositionists uncovered the Iranian nuclear 
program in the early 2000s. Already in 1991, one of Israel’s leading newspapers reported that 
“according to various assessments, Iran is now some five years from producing the [nuclear] 
bomb.”52 Shortly after, IDF Intelligence reported that “Iran may achieve a dangerous nuclear 
and missile capability.”53 In 1995 an Israeli intelligence source reported to the daily Yedi’ot 
Aharonot that “Iran has been developing its ability to produce chemical warfare agents and 
has been stockpiling large quantities of them.”54 The source admitted that this has been going 
on since 1984, that is, while Israel assisted Teheran in the Iran-Iraq War. In reality, hardly 
any public discussion of Iranian ballistic capabilities had taken place in Israel prior to the 
1990s.55 This is despite the fact that Israeli policy makers supposedly had some knowledge of 
the subject, given that Israel may have assisted the Shah in developing such capacities.56 The 
possible explanation for that is that since Iran became so closely associated with radicalism, 
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actions which in the past could be considered acceptable even if taken by the revolutionary 
government, now transformed into signs of emanating threat. 
Israel’s sense of alarm can vividly in Ehud Barak’s 1996 “villa in the jungle” speech. 
In addition to this controversial statement, Barak also warned that 
The possibility of radical Islamic fundamentalism guiding global terror and acquiring the bomb 
is not a menacing prospect, but it may prove to be a real threat, not only to Israel, but to the 
stability of the region and to the world order as a whole.57 
He then added: “The Arab political leadership, excluding countries like Iraq, Libya, and Iran 
has in fact recognized Israel…We now have relations with one hundred and seventy 
countries, including a promising beginning of ties with Tunisia, Oman and Qatar.” 58 Barak’s 
speech does not only unveil the changing nature of threat in Israel’s view; it also conceals the 
nucleus of the Moderate Axis Conception, namely the idea that Iran constitutes a threat to 
regional stability, and therefore to Israel’s neighbors. 
These developments affected the tilt toward the Moderate Axis Conception. One of 
the first to identify the new trend is Leon Hadar. In 2001 Hadar pinpointed the consolidation 
of two major camps among Israeli policy making circles, to which he referred to as the 
“Turkey” and the “Egypt” schools of thought. The “Turkey school,” according to Hadar, 
advocated Israel’s strategic partnership with Ankara as the main pillar of Israel’s regional 
security strategy. As such, members of the school represented the prevalent thinking during 
the 1990s. Many of the members of this school were hawks who objected to any territorial 
compromise with the Palestinians, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his first 
term as prime minister. The strategic partnership with such a powerful regional actor, they 
believed, deemed other regional arrangements unnecessary. In contrast, the “Egypt school” 
advocated closer collaboration with Cairo. Through Cairo, this school sought to form a 
regional coalition with the Arab states in order to counter the Iranian threat. Peace with the 
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Palestinians, according to the Egypt school, was a necessary component of this process.59 The 
leading member of this school was Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Foreign Minister in Barak’s Labor 
government. 
The Egypt school marked an early stage of the Moderate Axis Conception. 
Nonetheless, these were regional and global developments during the early 2000s that 
advanced the conception to the mainstream of Israeli thinking. These included the eruption of 
the Second Intifada in October 2000, the September 11 attack, and the American-led invasion 
of Iraq and the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime. These developments had several important 
implications: they amplified the globalizing threat of radical Islamism; and they created 
incentives, and opportunities, for collaboration between Israel and the so-called moderates. 
The second Intifada marked the increasing power and influence of the rejectionist 
front. Hamas and Islamic Jihad now enjoyed unprecedented support among the Palestinian 
public, partly as a reaction to the degeneration and corruption of the PLO leadership 
dominating the Palestinian Authority (PA). Moreover, the tactic of suicide attacks, long 
associated with Islamist insurgency, was now embraced by the supposedly secular insurgents, 
such as Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement (or at least elements of it). In addition, the Second 
Intifada once again drove Israel toward temporary isolation. Particularly traumatic has been 
the rift with Ankara. Now ruled by the conservative and religiously-oriented Justice and 
Development Party, Turkey gradually began severing its close cooperation with Israel. On the 
Arab front, Qatar and Oman officially closed Israeli diplomatic representations in their 
capitals.60 
In 2002 new information began pouring on the Iranian nuclear program. An Iranian 
opposition group unearthed the construction of a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy 
water installation by the Iranian government. This was a clear violation of the Non-
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Proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a signatory. Its failure to report these two projects to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency intensified the notion that Iran was trying to conceal its 
program. As noted above, Israel had already envisaged an Iranian nuclear threat in the early 
1990s. The news on Iran’s moves seemed to buttress Israeli fears. In addition to that, Iran 
also deepened its covert activism in the region. Further to its traditional alliance with 
Hezbollah and Syria, Iran now strengthened its relations with the Palestinians. In January 
2002, in the midst of the Intifada, the Israeli navy captured a ship carrying 50 tons of 
weapons, including Katyusha rocket launchers, AK-47 rifles and more, to the PA. Following 
an investigation, the Israeli authorities concluded that the weapons were shipped to the 
Palestinians from Iran. Some have casted doubt in the validity of this allegation,61 but for 
Israel this was a proof of Iranian presence on its doorstep. Regionally, with the overthrow of 
the Ba’ath regime Iran’s influence in Iraq grew sharply. The victory of a coalition of Shi’i 
parties, dominated by the Islamic Da’wa Party, provided Iran with unprecedented access to 
Iraqi policy makers. Iranian-backed Shi’i militias, such as Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army), 
were now garnering popular support by fighting Sunni insurgents and American and British 
presence in Iraq. Shi’i clerics, once persecuted by the Ba’ath, were now free to act. 
The September 11 attacks illustrated the threat emanating from transnational networks 
of Islamists insurgents. In addition to its traumatizing effect, the attack also served as a 
turning point in regional geopolitics, which became crucial for the formation of the Moderate 
Axis Conception. Following the attack, the George W. Bush administration redrew the 
political map of the Middle East. This map bluntly divided states in the region into “good” 
and “bad,” namely those who fight terrorism, and those who support it.62 The administration 
defined the latter as the “axis of evil,” comprising of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The former 
camp, on the other hand, consisted of Egypt, Jordan, the GCC member-states, the North 
African governments, and of course Israel. The term “moderate Arab states” resurfaced in 
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American discourse. Reviewing American-Egyptian relations, a 2002 Issue Brief for the 
Congress stated that “Another U.S. interest in good relations with Egypt is to sustain Egypt’s 
moderate voice in Arab councils.”63 A January 2003 report to Congress regarding the ensuing 
invasion of Iraq concluded that “there have been signs that some moderate Arab states may 
be softening their previous opposition to allowing large-scale U.S. military operations from 
their territory against Iraq.”64 
Israel was quick to express its sympathy with the US. Yet, it also spotted in the new 
reality common grounds with the moderate Arab regimes. Advocacy for cooperation began 
shortly after the attacks. David Kimche, a former diplomat and senior Mossad operative, 
publicly urged Israeli representatives to meet with Yasser Arafat in order to “enhance the 
support of the moderate Arab states in the Bush administration.”65 That Kimche, during his 
service in the Mossad, was heavily involved in the formulation of the Periphery Doctrine 
reaffirms the link between the two agendas. The significance of Kimche’s message also lies 
in the fact that now the PLO became a “member” of the moderate club. Even Ariel Sharon, a 
fierce objector to reconciliation in the past, accepted the existence of a moderate axis among 
the Arabs, although he excluded the PLO from this axis. In a speech before the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 2001 Sharon stated that “Arafat and the 
Palestinian Authority are returning to the belief that they can defeat Israel by means of armed 
struggle... Arafat is willing to destabilize the entire Middle East, including moderate Arab 
regimes, in order to achieve his goals.”66 
Sharon’s statement did not reflect merely a wishful thinking. In the period following 
September 11 the so-called moderates signaled their willingness to accommodate Israel. 
Although they had to pay some lip service to the Palestinian cause, informal dialogue was 
taking place between the Arab regimes and Israel. Even though the Israeli representation in 
Qatar was officially shut down, the head of Israeli representation in Doha disclosed that 
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Israeli representatives still remained in the city.67 A more blatant sign for the continuation of 
dialogue was the Arab Peace Initiative. The Initiative was presented in the 2002 Arab 
Summit in Beirut by the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah Al-Saud (thus known as the Saudi 
Initiative). Very broadly, it called Israel to withdraw to the 1967 lines, allow the formation of 
an independent Palestinian state, and resolve the Palestinian refugee question. In return, the 
Initiative committed to Arab normalization with Israel.68 
Israel did not formally accept the Initiative because of its insistence on Israel’s 
withdrawal to the 1967 borders rather than territory exchanges, and due to the failure of Arab 
representatives to establish direct channels to Israeli public opinion.69 Yet, this move served 
those who advocated reconciliation with the Arabs in promoting their cause. One 
commentator for the left-leaning Haaretz newspaper suggested that the initiative was a 
“Saudi-Egyptian effort to halt terror.”70 MK Roman Bronfman lamented that “in recent 
months we have missed a historic opportunity… The government, the Knesset and the public 
have not treated this transition in the position of the moderate Arab states with the respect it 
deserves.”71 
But perhaps the most significant push for cooperation was the growing Arab 
willingness to discuss the rise of the alleged Shi’i threat. It was King Abdullah II of Jordan 
who most vividly expressed this notion. The violence in Iraq, Hezbollah’s militancy on the 
one hand and its increasing political leverage in Lebanon on the other, and the tightening 
Iranian-Syrian cooperation drove King Abdullah to warn in an interview to the Washington 
Post of a “Shi’i crescent.” With Iran at its core, the king suggested that this axis has aimed to 
destabilize the Gulf region and lead to an all-out Sunni-Shi’i conflict. He added that “Even 
Saudi Arabia is not immune from this.”72 Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia protested this portrayal 
of regional politics, and even the US, Jordan’s ally, eschewed the king’s terminology. 
Eventually, the king changed his tone and expressed support for the Iraqi political process.73 
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Notwithstanding these denials, on the ground the fear of a perceived Shi’i crescent was 
spreading among Israel’s neighbors.74 
For the Israeli leadership, the Sunni alarm of the Shi’i crescent reasserted its own 
fears. However, it was not just the Shi’i threat that Israel shared with the moderate regimes. It 
was Islamist radicalism in general. At this stage, Israel came to view the moderate Arab 
regimes, not states, in the same terms that Michael Barnett had earlier applied to Israel; as 
“existentially isolated” and facing “a series of threats from various quarters that vary only in 
the level of overt intensity and hostility.”75 
The Moderate Axis Conception has been the product of Israel’s new understanding of 
itself and Arab neighbors. At its core stood the idea that Israel could establish strategic 
collaboration with its neighbors on a regional basis, with the aim of countering the now 
prevalent threat – Sunni and Shi’i alike. Shlomo Ben-Ami summarized this conception by 
asserting that “the threat from Iran and from Islamic fundamentalism,” together with “the will 
of… the so-called moderate Arab countries,” were enough to pave the way to cooperation 
and collaboration with Israel.76 
By the mid-2000s, the concept of moderate Arab states became an integral part of 
Israeli discourse, pointing to the change Israeli leaders have undergone in assessing their 
potential regional allies. One example is a speech carried in 2006 by Foreign Minister Tzipi 
Livni, a former Likud hawk, at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
I believe that the interest of Israel, the interest of Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat’s 
successor as the leader of the PA], and the interest of the international community -- plus the 
interest of moderate Arab leaders in our region -- are the same interest [sic]… When we are 
talking about moderate Arab states or moderate Arab leaders, of course they are facing forces 
of extremism and radicalism within their own states… [the] Hamas leadership is not only a 
threat to Israel, it’s not only a threat to the moderate Palestinian society, but it is also or can be 
a threat and it can send a wrong message to the extremists within these moderate Arab states.77 
26 
 
Livni’s statement presents the essential idea behind the Moderate Axis Conception, namely 
that Israel has come to associate the moderate Arab states (including the PA) with one of the 
core Israeli characteristics – the adherence to a regional status quo, based national interests 
represented by the different states. With time, I demonstrate below, Israeli policymakers 
became more and more committed to this notion. Before, nevertheless, we should perhaps 
question Israel’s aims with regard to the Moderate Axis Conception. What has Israel hoped to 
achieve through this potential informal collaboration with the moderate governments? 
Answering this question could shed more light not only on Israel’s motivations, but also on 
the ideas shaping its decisions. 
 
Aims of the Moderate Conception 
The Periphery Doctrine had a visible military logic to it. Its advocates envisaged a scenario in 
which members of the alliance would come to each other’s help in times of crisis. This 
materialized rarely and only bilaterally (with Turkey in 1998, the Maronites in 1982 and 
1958, and Iran in the 1970s). Multilateral cooperation took place primarily in the form of 
intelligence exchange. Nevertheless, the military element did guide this doctrine. 
In the Moderate Axis Conception this element has been largely absent. One reason is 
that in spite of the rapprochement between Arab regimes and Israel, and the seeming shared-
interests, the Arab public has kept viewing Israel as an illegitimate entity. Sympathy with the 
Palestinians, religious sentiments and inherent distrust of Israel have contributed to that. 
Consequently, no Arab regime, including Egypt, Jordan and the GCC states, could militarily 
collaborate with Israel without risking their domestic legitimacy. The second reason is the 
military weakness of most Arab armies. The Turkish, Iranian and Ethiopian armies were 
formidable forces in regional terms. In contrast, the Arab armies have exhibited mostly 
27 
 
debility in recent decades. Since the 1970s the Arab armies have been primarily preoccupied 
with suppressing domestic threats to the stability of the regimes, rather than with militaries’ 
traditional purposes.78 The 1991 Gulf War exposed this weakness when the Arab regimes that 
supported the invasion, albeit their intensive investment in arms purchases before the war, 
had to rely on external help to defeat Iraq. 
Despite these weaknesses, the moderate Arabs have had some important assets to 
offer to Israel. The first asset has had some tactical value. In preparation for a possible 
airstrike on Iran, the moderate Arab states, and especially Saudi Arabia, could provide the 
attackers, either Israel, the US, or an international coalition, access to Iran. Israel has 
expected that in case of an initiated strike, Saudi Arabia and Jordan would allow Israeli 
jetfighters to cross their airspace. Negotiations over this took place under the orchestration of 
Meir Dagan, the former chief of Mossad.79 Several reports argued that the Saudis had given 
their consent to the plan,80 although the Israeli government denied them.81 
The second asset lucidly reflects the ideational element in the Moderate Axis 
Conception. This asset has been legitimacy for Israeli operations against radical Islamists, 
namely Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. This legitimacy meant implicit, or 
even explicit, support for actions which in the past the moderates might have harshly 
condemned. This support could take the form of expressing support for Israel’s actions and 
needs; condemnation of the other party; or silent consent. This support has offered Israel a far 
wider room for maneuvering not only vis-à-vis its adversaries, but also international 
community. After all, if Arab leaders can accept Israeli conduct, Israel’s allies in Europe and 
the United States could not turn their backs on it. 
One example for this support was Israel’s 2006 Lebanon War. Both the Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi government rebuked Hezbollah for its adventurism 
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and for starting the crisis. Israel relied on this condemnation to justify the continuation of the 
operation.82 This led one Israeli analyst to suggest that “undoubtedly, Israel and the moderate 
states are in consent with regard to the Iran’s regional aspirations and the danger of radical 
Islam in the region, whether supported by Iran or not.”83 Another example took place in 2009, 
when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza. Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf 
States and Morocco refrained from condemning Israel. The Israeli ambassador to the UN, 
Gavriela Shalev, told at the time that “we have open European and American support, but 
there are other states that support us. They do not publicly identify with us, but they are 
worried about the rise of radical Islam and affiliated terror.”84 In a bolder step, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia prevented the assembling of the Arab League for the condemnation of Israel. 
Finally, Mubarak refused to give up to public pressure to lift the blockade from over the Gaza 
Strip as long as Hamas was controlling it.85 
Israeli commentators considered this a strategic achievement, and a sign of the 
maturation of the Moderate Axis Conception. In an article in Maarachot, the IDF’s monthly 
bulletin, a member of the IDF General Staff described the Gaza operation as an “important 
milestone in the development of Israel’s diplomatic strategy and military doctrine in coping 
with the radical axis.”86 He added that “Operation ‘Cast Lead’ bolstered the position of the 
moderate Arab states, led by Egypt, and helped in tying them to the struggle against the 
Iranian threat.”87 In another analysis of the operation, Shlomo Brom, a former IDF Major 
General, predicted that the rebuilding of Gaza would now turn into a battleground with “the 
PA, the moderate Arab axis and the West on the one hand,” and the “Iranian-led rejectionist 
axis” on the other.88 A report published by the influential Tel Aviv-based Institute for 
National Security Studies shortly after the crisis concluded that 
The majority of Arab states, and certainly the moderate among them, reject Hamas’s conduct 
and grip of Gaza, viewing it as a radical element affiliated with Iran and part of the radical Shi’i 
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axis, which threatens them, instigates the Palestinian arena and prevents any Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement. Most of them wish, even if secretly, that Israel will strike Hamas as it struck 
Hezbollah in 2006.89 
The moderates’ consent to a potential Israeli operation against Iran has been another 
consideration for Israel. Israeli officials have frequently alleged coalescence between Israel 
and the moderates on the subject. In 2006, shortly after the Lebanon crisis, Foreign Minister 
Livni reported to a journalist that “several Arab leaders approached her and discretely 
expressed their concern of Arab states supported by Iran.” The report added that “she also 
believes that Iran is the greatest threat to the region, and that the Hamas government shares 
this radicalism [with Iran].”90 Prompted by what he perceived as American hesitance on the 
subject, the former Defense Minister and a leading member of the “Egypt school,” Benyamin 
Ben-Eliezer, declared that the Iranian nuclear program threatens not only Israel, “but also the 
moderate Arab states, as well as American and European interests… There is an opportunity 
for cooperation based on a mutual interest between us, the Americans and the moderate Arab 
world, around the core issue – the Iranian threat.”91 
Israel’s freedom of maneuvering has not been unlimited though. If Israel gained some 
political leverage vis-à-vis Hamas, it now had to weigh carefully its actions on the PA front. 
The Moderate Axis Conception became a key factor in pushing for a resolution of the 
Palestinian-Israeli impasse. Already in 2004, the Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Ron 
Prosor, maintained at the prestigious Herzliya Conference that 
If we do not take into account the regional impact of each of our actions, we might miss an 
opportunity to change the nature of our region… Our key aim, which we share with the US, 
Europe and the moderate Arab states, is the emergence of a [Palestinian] leadership that could 
serve as a partner for negotiations and reduce the threat of terrorism… Correct conduct vis-à-
vis Europe, the Quartet and the moderate Arab states could also provide dividends in other 
sectors and amid other threats to our national security… [We] must draw a road map for the 
moderate Arab states… that would lead to normalization of Israel’s place in the region and 
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would facilitate the peace process… Nuclear Iran has dramatic implications over the moderate 
Arab states’ ability to redefine the face of the entire Muslim world.92 
Benyamin Ben-Eliezer as well stressed that “We should take the opportunity and move 
toward negotiations… As soon as the moderate Arabs, led by Egypt, realize that we seriously 
intend to adopt a diplomatic resolution, they will cooperate with us and back up our 
moves.”93 Shlomo Ben-Ami, a long-time advocate of peace with the PA, explicitly described 
the Iranian threat as an “opportunity for a Middle East peace.”94 
At least until the eruption of the Arab uprisings in 2011, it seemed as if the moderate 
Arabs had accepted their role in the conception. They have certainly utilized it for promoting 
their stance on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Following the 2006 Lebanon War the Qatari 
Foreign Minister, Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, called Israel to return to negotiations. He warned 
that “Maybe [the next generation of Arab leaders] will once again say they want to throw the 
Israelis into the sea. So why not take advantage of reasonable people and cut a deal?”95 In 
2007 the Saudis reiterated their 2002 peace initiative. This time they modified it to meet some 
of Israel’s early concerns. In a 2008 op-ed in Haaretz, Marwan Mubasher, the former 
Jordanian ambassador to Israel and Jordan’s Foreign Minister, wrote that “the initiative was 
the embodiment of the moderate camp in the Arab world and of its leap of faith in addressing 
both Arab and Israeli needs.” He went on to describe it as an interest shared by “the moderate 
camp, in both the Arab world and in Israel.” He concluded that “The moderate Arab Peace 
Initiative still stands and goes a long way toward achieving that objective.”96 
Israeli policymakers and mainstream media responded positively to this development. 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who in 1986 denied the existence of Arab moderates, now 
pledged before the Knesset’s Security and Foreign Affairs Committee that “Every initiative 
by the Arab states and the Saudis – if they wish to negotiate – we will.”97 An editorial in 
Haaretz asserted that Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran “created a rare common incentive for Israel, 
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the Arab League, and the Quartet - headed by the United States - to strengthen the circle of 
Middle East moderates… before Tehran completes its nuclear program.”98 Yet, just as in the 
case of the Periphery Doctrine, domestic upheavals joined regional developments in 
undermining Israel’s new conception. 
 
The Arab Spring and the Future Prospects of the Conception 
Not everyone in Israel has embraced the conception. On both left and right, Israeli 
commentators have questioned its validity. For instance, Zvi Barel, a veteran commentator on 
Middle Eastern affairs at Haaretz, wrote in a 2010 op-ed that “the idea that there is a bloc of 
moderate Arab states that detest Iran and are capable of taking part in a military operation at a 
time of conflict might turn out to be yet another empty slogan, formulated in the corridors of 
the White House.”99 
The widespread popular upheaval that erupted in the Arab World toward the end of 
2010 has somewhat validated such views. Between 2010 and 2011 it resulted in the 
overthrow of the Tunisian, Yemeni, Libyan and Egyptian governments. These events, which 
have come to be known as the Arab Spring, have had visible effects on the regional 
geopolitical map, and have borne potential implications for Israeli foreign policy. Tyrannical, 
conservative and generally hostile toward all forms of radicalism, including political Islam, 
Israel considered these regimes, except for Libya, as members of the moderate axis. Most 
painful from an Israeli perspective has been the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Under 
Mubarak, Egypt had been a pivotal element in the moderate axis and its military and security 
services tightly cooperated with Israel in its struggle against Hamas in the Gaza Strip and 
against al-Qaeda cells in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. The ousting of Mubarak was followed by 
purges of senior security personnel, many of whom had close personal relationships with 
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Israeli policymakers and intelligence community.100 In 2012 a new president was elected by 
the Egyptian people – Mohammed Morsi, a member of the conservative Islamist, and up-until 
then quasi-legal, Muslim Brotherhood. Upon his election Morsi pledged to “honor 
agreements it [Egypt] had signed,” referring to the Camp David peace agreement.101 But the 
tight coordination of the Mubarak era was gone. 
No less detrimental than the overthrow of conservative regimes has been the shock 
effect it had on the regimes that survived the Arab Spring. Those now realized the potential 
repercussions of popular unrest. While suppressing public protests, they also rushed to 
demonstrate their willingness to meet popular demands. Their de facto normalization of 
relations with Israel was one of the first victims. In 2012, Saudi Arabia warned that it will 
intercept any Israeli airplane violating its airspace.102 Certainly, Saudi Arabia never publicly 
condoned an Israeli operation against Iran, nor has it ever committed to allowing any form of 
Israeli presence in its territory and airspace.103 Nonetheless, the public renouncement of the 
idea was exceptional. This served the leaders of the moderate axis to preempt attacks from 
the rising Islamist-oriented governments in Egypt and Tunisia (as well as the rebels in Syria). 
Despite the negative implications, the Arab Spring has had some positive aspects 
from an Israeli perspective. The civil war that has ravaged Syria since 2011 has further 
distanced the possibility of a conventional war. The weakening of Bashar al-Assad and the 
Ba’ath regime has also meant that the temporary fall of an important ally of Iran and a supply 
route to Hezbollah. Nevertheless, as uncertainty remains high, Israeli policy makers are still 
struggling to figure out what the future may yield up. In 2012, nearly two decades after he 
first made his “villa in the jungle” statement, Ehud Barak reiterated it. Celebrating the Jewish 
New Year in an air force base, he declared that “this is neither Western Europe nor North 
America. This is a tough environment, indeed a ‘villa in the jungle’, and we are surrounded 
by hostile elements.”104 
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Conclusion 
Concluding the section on the Periphery Doctrine, I explained how paying attention to 
Israel’s identity can better explain some of the puzzles regarding Israel’s security agenda and 
its preference of allies. To put it shortly, Israel stuck to the Periphery Doctrine even after its 
foundation had proven to be shaky, its members had turned their back on it and the threat 
upon which it was based had declined both in terms of commitment and capabilities. 
The analysis of the Moderate Axis Conception that follows does not only serve to 
describe the change that Israeli foreign policy has undergone; it also helps to buttress my 
argument about the Periphery Doctrine, and about the centrality of identity in Israel’s foreign 
policy making. The Iranian threat has been constructed along the rise of Islamism as an 
alternative to pan-Arabism as the embodiment of radicalism and the main threat to regional 
order. Islamism became a threat before Iran had begun developing its nuclear capabilities. On 
the other hand, Israel was willing to assist Iran even though it was aware of its arsenal of 
chemical weapons. In other words, both Iran’s intentions and capabilities have been 
understood by Israel not from a pure strategic assessment, but rather through Israel’s self-
perception. This can be applied to radical Islamism in general. 
In short, then, aspects of continuity in Israeli foreign policy have been far greater than 
what most analysts and commentators have assumed. Even more importantly, they have been 
as great, or even greater, than aspects of change. The Moderate Axis Conception has meant 
that different actors now assumed different roles – past radicals have now turned into the 
moderates. The center, in turn, has been occupied by a new force, that is, radical Islamism. 
The new form of threat has steered the Middle East into a new era of uncertainty and 
struggle. Nonetheless, the essence of the Periphery Doctrine has survived the transitions. In 
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spite of the shifts in regional balance of power and the new political dynamics, of which 
Israel has been an inseparable part, Israel still views itself as a peripheral actor, facing 
constant pressures from the center. The Moderate Axis Conception embodies this as the 
moderate regimes have come as well to be seen in these terms. 
The still unfolding events of the Arab Spring mark a turning point in regional 
geopolitics. As violence still rages in Syria, and as the Egyptian army struggles to consolidate 
its power vis-à-vis the various Islamist factions in the country, it is still hard to envision the 
future political map of the Middle East. Nevertheless, we can assume that some important 
changes may take place. Israel may be slow to respond to such changes, as happened in the 
transition from the Periphery Doctrine to the Moderate Axis Conception. Or it may learn the 
lessons and quickly reassess its old commitments and agendas. But if there is one thing we 
can learn from Israel’s policy making and responses to changing regional threats is that the 
actions and decisions of Israeli foreign policy makers will continue to be percolated through 
its identity and self-perception. Whether these are going to change is as difficult as 
determining the future of the Middle East. 
                                                 
1 The adjective moderate is not uncontroversial. Commentators, and especially in the Arabic media, tend to add 
inverted commas when using the term. While the arguments against describing these states or governments as 
moderate are substantial, this paper does not devote space to this debate. The point here is that Israeli 
policymakers, media and public have come to associate these actors with political moderation.  
2 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 1. 
3 Michael Barnett, “The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating and the Un/thinkable,” in Shibley 
Telhami and Michael Barnett, ed., Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 62. 
4 Michael Barnett, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo,” European Journal of 
International Relations 5, 1 (1999), 5-36. 
5 Ibid., 11. 
6 Mira Sucharov, The International Self: Psychoanalysis and the Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2005). 
7 Ze’ev Jabotinsky, “The Iron Wall,” Razsviet 4 November 1923, English translation can be found at 
http://www.jabotinsky.org/multimedia/upl_doc/doc_191207_49117.pdf. For a discussion on the implications of 
Jabotinsky’s thought on the planning of Israeli foreign policy see Sasson Sofer, Zionism and the Foundations of 
Israeli Diplomacy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 199-224. 
8 Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address by Foreign Minister Ehud Barak 
to the Annual Plenary Session of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council,” 11 February 
1996, accessed at 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1996/2/FM+Barak-+Address+to+NJCRAC+-+Feb+11-
+1996.htm?DisplayMode=print, 6 July 2012.  
9 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 107, 161; Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader and Parisa Roshan, Israel and Iran: A 
Dangerous Rivalry (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2011), 19. 
10 Efraim Inbar, “Israel’s New Strategic Partners: Turkey and India,” BESA Reader in National Security 77 (July 
2008), 2 [in Hebrew]; Leon T. Hadar, “The Collapse of Israel’s ‘Periphery Doctrine’: Popping Pipe(s) Turkey 
Dreams,” The Huffington Post, 18 June 2010, accessed at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leon-t-hadar/the-
collapse-of-israels-p_b_617694.html, 13 October 2012. See also Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relations: 
Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan).  
11 Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); Brecher, 
Decisions in Crisis (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980). 
12 Ofira Seliktar, New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel (London & Sydney: Croom helm, 1986). 
13 Sasson Sofer, Zionism and the Foundations. 
14 Barnett, “Culture, Strategy;” Barnett, “The Israeli Identity.” 
15 Sucharov, The International Self. 
16 Brent E. Sasley, “Affective Attachments and Foreign Policy: Israel and the 1993 Oslo Accords,” European 
Journal of International Relations 16, 4 (2010), 687-709. Citation taken from 690. 
17 Michael Barnett’s studies are a notable exception. 
18 Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience of Lebanon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
19 Kirsten Schulze, “Perceptions and Misperceptions: Influences on Israeli Intelligence Estimates during the 
1982 Lebanon War,” The Journal of Conflict Studies 16, 1 (1996). 
20 Nasser’s approach to Zionism and Israel is articulated in his book, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the 
Revolution [translated from Arabic] (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1955). 
21 The writings of Michel Aflaq, one of the Ba’ath’s founders, reflect the traditional Ba’athist views of Israel 
and imperialism. English translations can be found on the Ba’ath website: http://albaath.online.fr/English/Aflaq-
09-On%20Imperialism%20and%20Zionism.htm 
22 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1998), especially 146-160. 
23 Baruch Uziel, “The Peripheral Alliance,” Beterem (November 1948), 8–11. As cited by Bengio, The Turkish-
Israeli Relations, 33-34. 
24 For a review of this trend in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict see Jonathan B. Isacoff, Writing the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 67-71 
25 Uziel, The Peripheral Alliance: A Suggestion for Israeli Policy (Tel Aviv: Hamerkaz, 1959), 3–31. Cited by 
Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relations, 33-34. 
26 Baruch Gilad, “Introduction,” in Yeoshua Froindlikh, ed., Documents of the Foreign Policy of Israel, Volume 
13, 1958-1959 (Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001), 24 [in Hebrew]. 
27 Qassem initially sympathized with pan-Arabism, and was inspired by Nasserism. Nevertheless, he abandoned 
pan-Arab slogans rather early and embraced Iraqi local patriotism. Uriel Dann, Iraq under Qassem: A Political 
History, 1958–1963 (London: Pall Mall, 1969). 
28 A Nasserist officer, Gaafar al-Nimeiri, toppled the elected government in Khartoum 1969. Interestingly, the 
Sudanese Islamist Ummah Party also approached the Israeli government for help in countering Sudanese 
Nasserists. Michael Bar Zohar, “David Ben-Gurion and the Policy of the Periphery,” in Itamar Rabinovich and 
Jehuda Reinharz, ed., Israel and the Middle East, Second Edition (Lebanon, NH: Brandeis University Press, 
2008), 192. 
29 As Ben-Gurion put it, “its [Turkey’s] hatred of the Arabs is not as great as that of Iran;” in a letter to Abba 
Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington. As quoted in Bar Zohar, “David Ben-Gurion,” 194. 
30 Gilad, “Introduction,” 36-37. 
31 For a first-hand analysis of Sadat’s policies prior and during the 1973 War see William B Quandt, Peace 
Process, third edition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 87-129 
32 Iraq’s nuclear aspirations led Menachem Begin to order the attack on Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor in June 
1981. 
33 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 91-104. 
34 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. 
35 As recalled by former Major General and later MK Mordechai Tzipori. In William E. Farrell, “Israel 
Describes Massacre Report,” New York Times 18 November 1982. 
36 Schulze, “Perceptions and Misperceptions.” 
37 Bar Zohar, “David Ben-Gurion,” 193. 
38 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: Palestine,” 18 January 1939 C.P. 4 (39), 18052, 2. 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
39 James S. Lay Jr., “Statement by the National Security Council of Long-range U.S. Policy toward the Near 
East,” NSC 5801/1, 24 January 1958, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–
1957, XII (1958-1960), document 5. 
40 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Arab Attitudes and British Economic Interests in 
the Middle East,” 7 July 1967 C.(67) 123, CAB/129/132, 38.  
41 Central Intelligence Bulletin, 20 November 1973, 2. 
42 Central Intelligence Bulletin, Untitled, 26 November 1973. 
43 Directorate of Intelligence, “Possible Outcomes and Implications of the Iran—Iraq War,” CIA Memorandum, 
17 May 1982. 
44 Minutes from the 11th session of the 158th Knesset Assembly, 1 January 1986 [in Hebrew]. 
45 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew, 20 August 1981. As cited by Foreign Broadcast International Service 
[henceforth FBIS]-MEA-81-162, “Sharon Discusses Soviet Activity, U.S. Relations,” 21 August 1981. 
46 Yitzhak Rabin, “Israel Should Help the Christians Help Themselves,” Yedi’ot Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 
October 17, 1978. As cited by FBIS-MEA-78-200, October 16, 1978. 
47 Meliha Altunisik, “The Turkish Israeli Rapprochement in the post-Cold War Era,” Middle Eastern Studies 36, 
2 (2000), 172-191, at 185; Efraim Inbar, “The Resilience of Israeli-Turkish Relations,” Israel Studies 11, 4 
(2005), 592. 
48 Michael Bishku, “The South Caucasus Republics and Israel,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, 2 (March 2009), 
295-314. 
49 Uzi Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” The Middle East Journal 63, 3 
(Summer 2009), 443-459, at 447-450. 
50 Gawdat Bahgat, Israel and the Persian Gulf (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida), 119.  
51 Efraim Inbar, “Israel's Strategic Environment in the 1990s,” Journal of Strategic Studies 25, 1 (2002), 21-38. 
52 Ron Ben-Yishai,”The Middle East is Racing, not Striding, toward the Nuclear Era,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 28 
October 1991. As cited by the FBIS-NES-91-210, 30 October 1991. 
53 Ron Ben-Yishai, “Generals versus the Political Echelons,” Yedi’ot Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 27 
December 1991. Cited by FBIS-NES-91-251, 16 December 1991. 
54 Arye Egozi, “Concern Noted over Iran’s Chemical Warfare Agents,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, 4 January 1995. As 
cited by FBIS-NES-95-006, 10 January 1995. 
55 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 104. 
56 Davida Ginter, “Exclusive: This is how Israel Assisted Iran in Building the Nuclear Reactor,” NRG, 26 
August 2007 [in Hebrew], accessed at http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/628/073.html, 5 December 2012. 
57 MFA, “Address by Foreign Minister.”  
58 Ibid. 
59 Leon Hadar, “Orienting Jerusalem toward Ankara or Cairo? Israel's New Geostrategic Debate,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 12, 3 (Summer 2001), 24-27. 
60 Rabi, “Qatar’s Relations with Israel,” 450-452. 
61 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 234. 
62 Ivan Leudar, Victoria Marsland, and Jiri Nekvapil, “On Membership Categorization: ‘Us’, ‘Them’ and 
‘Doing Violence’ in Political Discourse,” Discourse and Society 15 (2004), 243-266. 
63 Clyde R. Mark, “Egypt-United States Relations,” Congressional Research Services [CRS] Issue Brief for 
Congress IB93087 (July 2002), 2. 
64 Alfred B. Prados, “Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Actions,” CRS Report for Congress RS21325 (January 
2003), 4. 
65 David Kimche, “Arafat-Peres Meeting is Vital,” Jerusalem Post, 17 September 2001. 
66 Ariel Sharon, “Towards a National Agenda of Peace and Security,” Address to AIPAC Policy Conference, 19 
March 2001, accessed at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2001/Address+by+Prime+Minister+Ari
el+Sharon+to+AIPAC+Po.htm, 26 January 2013. 
67 Ya’acov Hadas, “Israel and the Gulf States,” in Uzi Rabi and Yoel Guzanski, ed., The Gulf States: Between 
Iran and the West, (Tel Aviv: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 37-40 [in Hebrew]. 
68 For an English translation of the Initiative see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm. 
69 Oded Eran, “The Saudi Peace Initiative,” in The Gulf States, 53-55 [in Hebrew]. 
70 Daniel Sobelman, “An Egytpian-Saudi Effort to Stop Terror,” Haaretz, 10 May 2002 [in Hebrew], accessed at 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1558789, 18 November 2012. 
71 Minutes from the 296th Session of the 15th Knesset, 8 April 2002 [in Hebrew], accessed at 
http://knesset.gov.il/tql/knesset_new/knesset15/HTML_28_03_2012_09-20-03-AM/20020408@296-
02APR08@004.html, 24 July 2012. 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
72 Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran; Leaders Warn Against 
Forming Religious State,” Washington Post, 8 December 2004. 
73 Salah Nasrawi, “King Abdullah Says Iraqi Election Set Good Tone for Mideast,” Associated Press [AP], 31 
January 2005. 
74 Juan Cole, “A ‘Shiite Crescent’? The Regional Impact of the Iraq War,” Current History (January 2006), 20-
26; Morten Valbjørn and André Bank, “Signs of a New Arab Cold War: The 2006 Lebanon War and the Sunni-
Shi‘i Divide,” Middle East Report 242 (Spring 2007), 6-11. 
75 To paraphrase Barnett’s description of Israel’s identity. See above. 
76 Shlomo Ben-Ami, “The Iranian Threat: Prelude to Doomsday or an Opportunity for a Middle East Peace?” 
Conference at the Bologna Center, SAIS, Bologna, Italy, 8 November 2007, 31. 
77 Israel MFA, “FM Livni addresses International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,” 20 November 2006, 
Accessed at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/FM%20Livni%20addresses%20In
tl%20Institute%20for%20Strategic%20Studies%2021-Nov-2006, 4 March 2013 
78 Yoel Guzanski, “Beyond the Nuclear and Terror Threats: The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf,” 
Strategic Assessment 13, 1 (July 2010), 85-100. 
79 Roni Sofer, “No Agreement on Using Saudi Airspace for a Raid,” Ynet, 5 July 2009 [in Hebrew], accessed at 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3741306,00.html, 5 September 2012. 
80 Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, “Saudis Give Nod to Israeli Raid on Iran,” Sunday Times [London], 5 July 
2009; Hugh Tomlinson, “Israeli Bombers Offered Clear Skies for Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites,” The Times 
[London], 12 June 2010.  
81 Sofer, “No Agreement.” 
82 Steven Gutkin, “No Ceasefire Likely in Mideast Conflict,” AP, 17 July 2006. 
83 Emily Landau, “Reactions in the Arab World: Blurring of Traditional Lines,” INSS Strategic Update 9, 2 
(2006), 16-19, at 16 [in Hebrew]. 
84 Ronit Vardi, “Professor Gavriela Shalev, Israeli Ambassador to the UN: the Hypocrisy Surprised Me,” 
Globes, 7 January 2009 [in Hebrew], accessed at http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000414505, 
28 August 2012. 
85 AP, “Egypt Refuses Full Opening of Gaza Crossing,” 30 December 2008. 
86 Eran Ortal, “‘Cast Lead’: Lessons on the Conception of Operation,” Maarachot 425 (June 2009), 23-29, at 23 
[in Hebrew]. 
87 Ibid., 26. 
88 Shlomo Brom, “Operation ‘Cast Lead’, Gaza, January 2009: an Assessment,” INSS Strategic Update 11, 3 
(January 2009), 7-9, at 8 [in Hebrew]. 
89 Ephraim Kam, “Cast Lead: Regional Implications,” INSS Strategic Update 11, 4 (February 2009), 57-58 [in 
Hebrew]. 
90 Walla!, “Livni: The Moderate Arab States and Israel are on the Same Side,” 9 December 2006 [in Hebrew], 
accessed at http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/1020976, 12 August 2012. 
91 He also added, nonetheless, that Israel should not “stand at the front of this struggle.” Merav David, “Minister 
Ben-Eliezer: I am Baffled by the American Response,” NRG, 4 July 2009 [in Hebrew], accessed at 
http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/911/829.html, 2 February 2013. 
92 Ron Prosor, “National Security from a Foreign Policy Perspective,” Herzliya Conference, 13-16 December 
2004 [in Hebrew], accessed at http://www.herzliyaconference.org/?CategoryID=225&ArticleID=1724, 14 
February 2013. 
93 David, “Minister Ben-Eliezer.” 
94 Ben-Ami, “The Iranian Threat.” 
95 Lally Weymouth, “The Street is not with us,” Newsweek, 21 August 2006, 65. 
96 Marwan Muasher, “The Initiative still Stands,” Haaretz (English edition), 15 August 2008, accessed at 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-initiative-still-stands-1.251887, 7 January 2013. 
97 Yoav Stern, Shahar Ilan and Aluf Ben, “Egypt and Jordan will Market the Arab Initiative in Israel,” Haaretz, 
19 April 2007 [in Hebrew], accessed at http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1403313, 22 November 2012. 
98 Editorial, “Don’t Miss this Opportunity,” Haaretz [English edition], 8 August 2007. 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/don-t-miss-this-opportunity-1.227043 
99 Zvi Barel, “The Moderate Arab States will Stop Iran? Think Again, Haaretz, 28 April 2010 [in Hebrew], 
accessed at http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1199508, 2 August 2012. 
100 Maggie Michael, “Court Convicts Mubarak-era Officials of Corruption” AP, July 12, 2011; Mideast Mirror, 
“Fear of Anarchy,” 24 November 2011. 
101 Mideast Mirror, “Analyzing Mursi,” 29 June 2012. 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
102 Ynet, “Saudi Arabia: We will Intercept any Israeli Plane on its Way to Iran,” 9 August 2012 [in Hebrew]. 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4266418,00.html, 14 August 2012. 
103 As argued by another Israeli columnist, Dror Eydar, in Israel Hayom. As brought by Mideast Mirror, 
“Confusion,” 10 August 2012. 
104 Neri Brenner, “Barak: It is Our Responsibility to Avoid Avoidable Wars,” Ynet, 10 September 2012 [in 
Hebrew], accessed at http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4279602,00.html, 9 January 2013. 
